At the same time, a few scientific theories calling this reduction into question developed throughout the 20 th century and are now in full bloom — quantum theory and complexity theory. Can mind be reduced to something else? This might be the most controversial question in philosophy. On the one hand, the academic scientific and philosophical establishment is committed to physicalist reductionism in general—the belief that physical stuff is all there is.
But at the same time, there are, arguably, no coherent theories of how consciousness can be physical, only theories about the brain-processes associated with consciousness. Scientists are figuring out a lot about how different kinds of cognition correspond to brain-activity, but nobody really has a clue how brain-activity comes to have experiential properties. The most popular theories fall into four main groups:.
Most people who assume this reduction also assume that quantum mechanical processes are not important for the generation of consciousness. This eloquent statement suggests that art relies on synergy—where combinations of elements have unpredictable properties. In science, we try to explain complexity in terms of simple elements in predictable relationships, with predictable outcomes. Reductionism implies attention to a lower level while holistic implies attention to higher level.
These are intertwined in any satisfactory description: and each entails some loss relative to our cognitive preferences, as well as some gain… there is no whole system without an interconnection of its parts and there is no whole system without an environment. This one comes from one of the founders of complexity theory, whose researchers attempt to understand the properties of complex systems, especially their amazing tendency to self-organize and produce emergent phenomena.
Such as how chemistry organizes into organisms, and organisms into ecosystems.
Varela, who has done a lot of concrete detailed research on these topics, tells us that reductionism and holism are both necessary to understand complex systems. Here are some more specific forms of reductionism :. Some phenomena which seem emergent include atoms, molecules, chemicals, life, mind, and society! An emergent property manifests only when elements are combined, usually in large numbers. Other examples include colors, musical chords, and personalities.
But, most of these things can be explained in terms of their parts, ideally; researchers frequently publish discoveries explaining emergent properties of nature with reductionism. Nonetheless, many emergent properties have not yielded to reductionism, and some people feel there are good reasons to think they will not. Perhaps nothing demonstrates inherent holism, like R. Quantum mechanics seems to demonstrate a more radical form of holism in which systems may have more definite properties than their constituents, which cannot be regarded separately without a loss of information.
But whether quantum holism matters above the sub-atomic scale is still a matter of controversy. Each personality is designated by a four letter code representing these categorizations; e. The clearest representation of ontological reduction in pop culture is the vision of the world as made of computer code, in the Matrix films. The theory of evolution. Synergetic geometry. Newtonian physics. It makes things more complicated. Reductions can hide biases. Two consequences follow. Second, and more important, it seems that the receptive fields of V1 neurons are actually altered by the stimuli to which they are exposed.
They are dynamic in the sense that the RF of the neuron changes with the category of stimulus. On the basis of this and related findings, Bair , has made the following prediction:. The primacy of the RF as a concept for embodying the function of V1 neurons will be replaced by a set of circuits and synaptic mechanisms as our computational models begin to explain ever more response properties. The receptive field can then be understood as an emergent property that changes with the statistics of the input. Although this discussion has focused on a theoretical question about a neuroscientific concept, we believe that this issue, and others like it, would benefit by the addition of philosophers to the debate.
Just as philosophers of science have participated in trying to investigate the fundamental concepts of other scientific theories, the concepts of neuroscience present important and interesting challenges. Among the reasons that a philosophy of neuroscience might capture one's interest is that it bears relations to many issues in other branches of philosophy.
It is likely that advances in the neurosciences will change how we approach these questions, and it is possible that the close relation to so many philosophical issues distinguishes the philosophy of neuroscience from other branches of the philosophy of science. As we noted above, neurophilosophy is the discipline that attempts to make use of neuroscience to illuminate problems about the mind. It seems very likely that neurophilosophy has been a more active area than the philosophy of neuroscience narrowly construed not only because the connections between neuroscience and philosophy of mind are the most direct but because the philosophers drawn to neuroscience are often philosophers of mind.
Although most philosophers of mind are typically functionalists who believe that mental entities are not identical to their physical realizers, it nonetheless seems plausible to many that a better understanding of the physical implementation of animal and human mental phenomena will contribute to understanding the mind more broadly. And to many nonfunctionalists, of course, the relevance of neuroscience is even greater. Common sense about perception suggests that perceptually guided action is based on our conscious perception of the environment.
The what pathway was thought to subserve the representation of the properties of an object or scene; the where pathway was thought to represent the location of an object in space. In , Milner and Goodale proposed a new way of thinking of this latter pathway. Instead of location in space, they proposed that this pathway is responsible for guiding motor interactions with the object.
Some of the most compelling evidence for their hypothesis comes from their study of a patient, DF, who had suffered carbon monoxide poisoning, leading to localized damage to the what pathway. Milner and Goodale found that DF was effectively blind; she could not, for example, correctly identify the orientation of a line in front of her. Another patient, RV, exhibited the reverse dissociation, known as optic ataxia. RV could describe objects while being unable to grasp them.
However, both took the perception of space to be a specific function of the conscious representations of visual scenes. If Milner and Goodale p. The experience of visually guided behavior as depending on these conscious representations is thus largely illusory. These findings are important not only to the philosophical theory of perception but to a number of other philosophical questions about consciousness, the role of the body in mental life, and the role of representation in cognition.
Unsurprisingly, neuroscience has proved to be relevant to the philosophy of psychology. Most important, a good deal of work has addressed the relation between psychology and neuroscience as theories see, e. The work of Patricia and Paul Churchland has been central in this area. Famously or infamously , they have predicted, and advocated for, the elimination of folk psychology and its replacement with the language of neuroscience see, especially, P.
Churchland ; P. Churchland One psychological phenomenon of considerable interest has been the understanding of other minds. Two broad hypotheses have been developed to explain this ability. The theory is constituted of causal laws, and mind reading is construed as an instance of theoretical, if unconscious, ratiocination. The second hypothesis is the simulation theory. That is, we simulate others' mental lives in the same neural systems that are involved in representing our own mental states, and process them with the neural machinery for decision making and planning we use to generate our own behavior.
According to simulation theory, offline simulation provides us with a grasp of the mental states of others and the ability to predict what they will do. Intriguingly, mirror neurons, a subpopulation of F5 neurons, are activated both when an action is performed by a monkey and when the monkey observes another individual performing the same action.
They are not activated when actions seem accidental or when similar movements are carried out by inanimate entities. What are mirror neurons for? Gallese and Goldman hypothesize that mirror neurons are involved in the development of mind reading. In particular, they argue that mirror neurons may be part of the mechanism that allows individuals to retrodict goals from behavior.
Suppose someone performs an action, such as picking up a cup. The mirror neurons of an observer will be activated by this action and will lead to the motor plan for the same action that was observed. The observer will thus be in a mental state of offline planning for an action, and this plan includes a goal.
On this hypothesis, therefore, mirror neurons give the observer access to the goal of the action and thus put her in the place of the performer of the action. Because mirror neurons put an observer into something like the same neural state as an agent, they may be one implementation of a simulation system devoted to reading the minds of others. If Gallese and Goldman's account is correct, then, it provides evidence that it is simulation that underpins mind reading rather than theory, at least in this limited context.
Neuroscience seeks to understand the biological system that represents the world and reasons about its representations. Advances in neuroscience may thus have the potential to influence our approach to a number of epistemological questions, including those regarding the nature of knowledge and belief, the justification of belief, and the roles of reason and emotion in grounding knowledge.
Much of epistemology is normative, and neuroscience is bound to yield descriptive information only.
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However, it is not implausible to suppose that our normative views will be affected by our best picture of how the brain works. An area in which philosophers of neuroscience have made contact with epistemology is the question of the pathological beliefs represented by psychiatric delusions see, e. The case for the relevance of delusion to philosophy was first made by Stone and Young , and a number of other philosophers have joined the debate.
Quine taught us that belief is a web and that a change in epistemic com p. Delusions, however, seem to violate this principle of epistemology. Patients suffering from these delusions are largely unimpaired except for the presence of a single delusional belief, or a small family of beliefs. The best known of the monothematic delusions is the Capgras delusion—the belief that someone or something, often a loved one, has been duplicated, and the object or person with which the sufferer is in contact is the duplicate.
If beliefs, construed as real psychological entities, constitute a web, then one would predict that it is impossible to adopt a new belief especially one having as many ramifications as the Capgras delusion without dramatic changes in much of the rest of the epistemic web.
But this is not the case. Patients with the Capgras delusion do not seem to integrate their delusion into the rest of their beliefs. Of course, delusions are pathological beliefs assuming they are beliefs at all , and their disconnection from the web of belief may be precisely part of what makes them pathological.
Just how beliefs can come to be so disconnected is an epistemological question worth exploring. Beliefs or beliefs together with desires typically motivate action. A second way in which delusions defy the standard picture of belief is that many delusions fail to motivate action. For example, it is not uncommon for individuals who suffer from the Capgras delusion to continue to live with the person they believe to be a duplicate of their spouse.
They may make no attempt to locate the true spouse nor to find out what happened to them. This is not the pattern with all delusions, but it is common enough to require explanation. Again, one might hypothesize that one aspect of delusional pathology is exactly that delusions can fail to motivate. An exploration of delusion may thus help us to understand the processes of motivation and their relation to belief.
Finally, work on delusion has also addressed the question of the rationality of people with delusions. One theoretical account of rationality is procedural: Accordingly, rationality is purely a matter of satisfying the norms of reasoning, whatever the contents of one's beliefs and desires. It is possible, therefore, that delusional individuals accept hypotheses that others would reject because their standards of evidence are not sufficiently high. However, it is unclear whether this difference from nondelusional subjects should count as a reason for deeming people with delusions to be irrational.
While their reasoning differs from control subjects, it actually approximates the Bayesian norms better than do controls although this is not, in and of itself, sufficient for rationality. Moreover, the differences in reasoning between people with delusions and those without are rather subtle, and it is not entirely plausible that this explains the florid irrationality of their beliefs.
One possibility is that people with delusions are irrational not because they violate procedural norms but because the contents of their beliefs are irrational see Lewis If this is the p. The philosophy of neuroscience addresses the metaphysics of mind to the extent that it is concerned with the relation between psychology and neuroscience as sciences of the mind.
Further, as neuroscience progresses, we expect that we will learn something about the ontology of particular mental properties, states, and processes. Neuroscience also makes contact with other metaphysical topics, including classical metaphysical issues, such as free will and mental causation see, e. The self is another topic of perennial interest. By now, the idea of the split brain is familiar see Gazzaniga , for a review. Surgical severing of the corpus callosum and related structures that connect the two hemispheres of the brain was first carried out in in an effort to prevent epileptic seizures from spreading from one hemisphere to the other.
Studies carried out on animals by Roger Sperry in the s see, e. In the majority of people, language comprehension and production is localized to the left hemisphere. He Gazzaniga , writes:. There were moments when one hemisphere seemed to be belligerent while the other was calm. There were times when the left hand controlled by the right hemisphere behaved playfully with an object that was held out of view while the left hemisphere seemed perplexed about why. He considers five possibilities: 1 Because the left hemisphere is the locus of language production and comprehension in most people , these patients have one mind in the left hemisphere, and the right hemisphere is a sort of automaton; 2 they have one mind in the left hemisphere, but the right hemisphere occasionally exhibits conscious mentality that is disconnected from the mind; p.
In all cases, however, the experience of mental unity hides the diversity and disconnection that lies beneath it. In this experiment, the patient, JW, was shown a series of pictures. One was of himself and a second was of a familiar person, MG. Nine other images were created by morphing these two images. The images were presented to each hemisphere separately, and the patient was asked to decide whether the picture was of himself or of MG.
When the images were presented to JW's right hemisphere, he tended to identify it as MG, whereas he identified himself more often when the pictures were presented to his left. At first blush, it might seem that neuroscience would have little to contribute to moral philosophy. However, some philosophers have begun to think that neuroscience can in fact teach us something about ethics.
Neuroscience is already informing our ideas about moral psychology, and there is good evidence that understanding how moral cognition works will have a bearing on our philosophical conception of morality. Some arguments have already been made linking the neurobiology of moral cognition to issues in metaethics Roskies One of the earliest findings in the area, and the one that has sparked the greatest interest among philosophers, is the study of Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen You are in a position to pull a lever to move the trolley to another track, where it will hit and kill only one person.
Do you pull the lever to save the five and kill the one? Most people say that they would. In the second p. Do you do it? Most people say that they would not. Given that both scenarios involve killing one person to save five, one might expect people's intuitions to be the same, either for or against killing one to save many.
But they are not. The puzzle is: Why not? Greene and colleagues presented the runaway trolley and footbridge scenarios to subjects in a functional magnetic resonance imaging fMRI paradigm and found that the pattern of neural activity generated by making a moral decision was different in the two cases. In the first scenario, increased activity in brain regions associated with working memory was observed dorsolateral prefrontal and parietal areas , whereas in the second, increased activity in brain regions associated with social and emotional cognition was found medial frontal gyrus, posterior cingulate gyrus, and bilateral superior temporal sulcus.
When nonmoral dilemmas were presented to subjects, the pattern of activation was the same as in the first moral scenario. Greene and colleagues hypothesize that the neural data provide evidence for the view that the contrasting moral judgments elicited by the runaway trolley cases derive from what are, in fact, two different cognitive processes for coming to a moral judgment, each of which is subserved by different functional neuroanatomy. Dilemmas like these activate brain regions that are evolutionarily old and deal with social and emotional stimuli.
This system produces fast and intuitive responses to moral problems. In contrast, scenarios like the trolley case activate a neural system that appeared more recently in evolutionary time. What distinguishes the runaway trolley case from the footbridge case is that, in the first case, the agent merely deflects an existing threat by pulling a lever to divert the trolley whereas, in the second, he is the author of the harm by pushing someone off the bridge.
These tantalizing results seem to have significant implications for a number of traditional moral debates, not least the debate between Humeans and Kantians about the relative importance of reason and emotion in moral judgment Greene et al. Considerable work remains to be done, however, in order adequately to elucidate the psychological and neural structure of moral decision making and its implications for philosophy.
In addition to the neuroscientific work that aspires to illuminate moral matters, a number of pressing ethical questions raised by the practice of neuroscience p. One of the central goals of neuroscience is control of, and intervention in, brain function Craver In addition to their promise in curing disease and dysfunction, advances in neuroscience raise the possibilities of cognitive enhancement, and noninvasive neuroimaging techniques raise issues about privacy and coercion, among others. We expect to see a significant expansion of this area as the ethical problems of neuroscience quickly become pressing see, e.
Surprisingly perhaps, neuroscience has also made inroads into aesthetics. Because aesthetic experience is, at least in part, perceptual experience, some effort has been made to better understand aesthetic experience by appealing to the psychology and neurobiology of perception. A volume vol. In that same year, the distinguished visual neurophysiologist Semir Zeki published Inner Vision Zeki in which he argues that modern art is deeply affected by the way the visual system works. A lovely example of the application of neuroscience to the perception of visual art is Margaret Livingstone's analysis of the Mona Lisa 's smile.
Livingstone cites Gombrich's , famous Story of Art to pose the problem:. What strikes us first is the amazing degree to which Lisa looks alive. She really seems to look at us and to have a mind of her own. Sometimes she seems to mock at us, and then again we seem to catch something like sadness in her smile. Livingstone's contention is that the mystery of the Mona Lisa— in any event, the mystery of her smile—is the result of the anatomy of the viewer's retina.
The center of the retina—the fovea—is more densely packed with photoreceptors than is the periphery and thus has the greatest spatial resolution. For that reason, we foveate on parts of an object or scene in order to make out its details. As one moves away from the fovea, photoreceptor density declines and acuity decreases. Livingstone claims, however, that this does not mean that peripheral vision is poor, merely that it is specialized for other things, such as organizing a scene, seeing large objects, and alerting us to places in space where we should direct foveal vision.
Thus, if one looks at a picture with different parts of the retina, a finer or coarser representation will result. However—and this is the crucial claim—coarser representations are not necessarily poorer ones. Rather, coarser images provide different information from that provided by finer images.
In order to see the effect of this on the Mona Lisa, Livingstone filtered the image three times to extract only its coarse, medium, or fine spatial components. In each of the three images, the expression on Lisa's face seems to be different—more cheerful in the coarse image p.
As the eyes move over the picture, coarser or finer images of Lisa's face will be processed by the visual system and, with those images, different expressions will be detected—now cheerful, then mocking and sad. A final reason to pursue the philosophy of neuroscience is to understand the project of natural science in general. Many of our views about science are informed by a philosophical treatment of particular paradigmatic sciences, usually physics. The philosophy of science has traditionally focused on physics and evolutionary biology for at least two reasons.
First, if one is in the business of trying to understand the character and workings of science, it makes sense to focus on sciences that are well developed both in methodology and in the success of their theories. Thus, explanations of the physical universe would best be explained by physics, and explanations of living phenomena by evolutionary theory. Science may function quite differently in the early stages of development, and this possibility justifies an investigation into a young science like neuroscience.
Further, there is no reason a priori to believe that all sciences function in the same way, and this suggests that comparative studies, and studies that range across a diversity of sciences, will illuminate the structure of science. Finally, the fraught relationship that neuroscience has with psychology provides a reason for thinking that neuroscience may exhibit unique features.
Whether philosophy of neuroscience provides novel views of science or shores up familiar views, the endeavor can enrich our picture of the nature and progress of science. We do not yet know whether the p. Further investigation is required to establish whether or not a better understanding of the relation between neuroscience and psychology will illuminate the structure of other sciences.
We have already encountered the Churchlands' view that the way to resolve the tension between psychology and neuroscience is to eliminate psychology and to redescribe psychological phenomena in neural terms. A more traditional candidate relation, both in the sciences of the mind and other sciences, is reduction , according to which in the classical syntactic picture of Nagel , a reducing theory, together with a set of bridge laws or definitions, can be used to derive the laws of the reduced theory. Reduction was the goal of the identity theory of the mind which was, for better or worse, superseded by functionalism.
Despite its having fallen out of favor in the philosophy of science, some notion of stepwise reduction between levels of neural organization remains an implicit goal of cognitive neuroscience. Moreover, functionalism requires that there be physical realizers of mental states for particular species or individuals. Neuroscience has not, to this point, produced a reduction of any reasonable fragment of psychological theory although there are examples concerning which a case could be made. The current inauspicious state of the classical reductionist project may be the result of a number of factors.
The latter possibility is of greatest interest to scientists and philosophers of science. Bickle , for example, argues that classical reductionism failed precisely because it adopted Nagel's conception of the reduction relation. The issue of reduction is historically linked to that of explanation.
More recent work, however, distinguishes explanation from reduction. Although some maintain the importance of reduction as a goal for neuroscience, others argue that the philosophical focus on reduction represents been a wrong turn, largely attributable to the dominance of physics in the philosophy of science.
According to Craver , for instance, a p. Following Salmon and others, Craver argues that explanation involves determining the causes of a phenomenon. Thus, neuroscientific explanations aim to describe mechanisms including components, activities, and organizations with explicit causal structure. Furthermore, he argues that a mosaic of explanations at different levels is appropriate for explaining these diverse phenomena and that the mosaic picture, and not reduction, best captures the unity of neuroscience. Our understanding of brain function is made possible, but also shaped and limited, by the numerous methods available to neuroscientists for investigating brain structure, function, chemistry, and the like.
Understanding these techniques, and the kind of information they provide, is another crucial task for philosophy of neuroscience. The discussion of the receptive field in section 2. All neuroscientific techniques provide us with a similarly limited window onto the vastly complex picture of how our brains work, with each technique enabling us to probe some spatially and temporally constrained aspect of brain function. Understanding the limitations of each technique is a central task for philosophy of neuroscience. The limitations of available techniques is one of a set of scientific concerns having to do with making inferences from data to theory.
A second question that may be of special importance in neuroscience is whether inferences about human cognition can be made from animal models. Whereas such inferences are made regularly in the biomedical sciences, it seems clear that, despite the genetic overlap across mammals, human cognition is qualitatively different, at least in some domains. A third issue of potential interest to philosophers is the logic of making inferences from data to theory in different branches of neuroscience.
The logic of inference is particularly well worked out in cognitive neuropsychology, so we use it as an illustration. Cognitive neuropsychology is a branch of cognitive psychology p. In such studies, inferences can be made about how the brain subserves behavior by characterizing both the lesion and its behavioral effects see, e. This is one of the few ways that neuroscientists are able to investigate human brain function by making use of nature's own experiments.
Coltheart presents a useful overview of the evidence of cognitive deficits with brain damage. The evidence falls into one of three categories: associations, dissociations, and double dissociations. One finds an association when a patient with brain damage is impaired on two tasks—say, understanding written words and understanding spoken words. A dissociation is present when a patient is impaired on one task, such as understanding written words, but not another, such as understanding spoken words.
A double dissociation requires two patients, one of whom is impaired on one task but not a second e. Of the three kinds of evidence for a theory, double dissociation is the strongest. Suppose one finds an association between reading and aural word comprehension. One reasonable hypothesis supported by this finding is that a single cognitive module subserves the comprehension of both written and spoken words.
Thus, damage to that part of the brain is likely to damage both. Association data are limited, then, because they can't distinguish these two hypotheses. The converse problem arises for dissociation. The evidence of a patient who is impaired on written comprehension but not on oral comprehension provides evidence for two distinct cognitive modules. However, a second hypothesis is also plausible here, namely, that there is only one module, which is damaged but not completely so.
In such a case, it is possible that a patient can carry out easier tasks subserved by this module but not more difficult ones. If one supposes that written comprehension is more difficult than oral comprehension, that could explain the facts presented by the patient. In double dissociation, however, competing hypotheses of the kind just discussed do not arise.
What is Philosophy?
That is not to say that different cognitive theories of the dissociation are not possible. If we have one patient who is impaired on written comprehension but is able to comprehend spoken words and another patient who is impaired on spoken words but is able to comprehend written words, the objection to the evidence of dissociation in one patient cannot be made. Double dissociations thus provide strong evidence for the existence of two modules subserving the dissociated abilities.
As we argued above, the case of functional brain imaging is a particularly pressing one Bogen Not everything that is doable should be done. It seems clear that there is a philosophy of neuroscience, but it's not clear why this should be the case. After all, there is not much in the way of philosophy of chemistry, geology, or physiology. More important, there is no philosophy of cardiology nor of nephrology. What makes the study of this organ so special? It seems there are at least four criteria for having a philosophy of x ; if a discipline fails all four, we might be inclined to think that a philosophical treatment of it is unnecessary.
The reasons are: 1 X is particularly important in our understanding of the world; 2 x presents particular puzzles of interest; 3 x has particular philosophical significance; and 4 x has special epistemological value. Physics and evolutionary biology arguably satisfy all four. How does neuroscience fare? Certainly, it is important in our understanding of the world: The brain mediates both cognition and action, and these phenomena occupy central places in the conceptual landscape.
Insofar as neuroscience can illuminate our understanding of cognition and action, it is a good candidate for a philosophical treatment. Neuroscience also presents interesting questions which may benefit from philosophical investigation, just as quantum mechanics has raised puzzles that require philosophical attention. These questions might include: How should the representational capacities of neurons be understood?
Is computation a good model for what the brain does? How do neuroscientific methods enable us to access phenomena of interest, and when do they fail? How do we integrate neuroscientific insights with those from other disciplinary inquiries? Neuroscience also satisfies the third criterion.
Physics has particular philosophical importance because of its historical claim to be the fundamental level of science and to be that level to which all physical phenomena in the universe may ultimately reduce. Neuroscience plays a similar role with respect to cognition: As we have seen, it has been argued that all mental phe p. Whether or in what way this is the case remains a matter of intense debate.
Finally, neuroscience also seems to satisfy the fourth criterion. It may also illuminate the very nature of understanding itself. In general, there seems to be little doubt that the primary motivation for a philosophy of neuroscience is the attempt to understand the nature of the mind and how it arises out of the physical substrate of the brain.
Whether there should be a philosophy of neuroscience, therefore, depends in large measure on how relevant understanding the brain is to understanding the mind, and this is largely an empirical question. Antireductionist arguments in the philosophy of mind have taught us that very little of scientific interest follows from the fact that the mind is constituted of the brain and its functions. Even if it is a metaphysical truth that the mind is identical to the brain, the science of the mind may or may not turn out to be a science of the brain.
Whether there ought to be a philosophy of neuroscience in the long run will depend on the closeness of the connection between neuroscience and the mind, although, as we have argued, even if antireductionism triumphs, there might still be sufficient motivation for having a philosophy of the brain sciences. At the moment, however, whether neuroscience is relevant to understanding the mind is one of the most important issues in philosophy. For that reason alone, if the philosophy of neuroscience did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it.
We are grateful to David Chalmers, Mazviita Chirimuuta, and Carl Craver for very helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of this chapter. We are also grateful to Catherine Carriere for research assistance and, particularly, to John O'Dea, who did a substantial literature search in the philosophy of neuroscience. Akins, K. Journal of Philosophy — Find this resource:. Visual receptive field organization. Current Opinion in Neurobiology — Barlow, H. Redundancy reduction revisited. Network: Computation in Neural Systems — Cognition — Bechtel, W.
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